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CONSCIOUSNESS IN EXTREMITY: DISCOURSE ON MADNESS 
AMONG THE TABWA OF ZAIRE 
Christopher DAVIS-ROBERTS * 
University of Michigan, USA 
The madman makes it possible for us to grasp the radical potential of consciousness at its h t s .  
He contradicts the other person’s discursive thinking towards the virtually inarticulable or 
unthought self. 
The Lakeside Tabwa of Shaba, Zaire, apprehend madness in three rather different, discursive 
domains. There is, firstly, w c u i m ,  or its ‘mature’, incurable form, kizeruezia, considered as a fact 
of social life. It is seen as inverting the norms or functions of personhood and undoing those of 
mentality. It breaks down reciprocity, it is the negative function of ‘Death’. Secondly, it is in the 
p r o d r o d  illness, mubulibuli, and certain related emotion states, that madness appears as the 
artefact of another’s malicious and intrusive ‘Desire’: the madman is said to have ‘closed anger’ in 
his heart alienating him from ongoing experience and interaction. Finally, in the diviner, the 
‘otherness’ of gaze and speech is transformed into the normative power of clairvoyance bringing 
about its own logic and historicity. Here, the inversion of personhood becomes an emblem of 
insight and ‘Law’, but at the risk of insanity. The ethnographic encounter with the very otherness 
of the thinking of madness and of another culture toward the unthought itself is, in a sense, 
epistemogenic. 
Introduction 
‘The stark impossibility of thinking that’ 
Michael Foucault’s Order of Things arose from the peal of laughter with 
which he chose to encounter in wonderment and in one great leap the 
limitations of his thought, as our thought, ‘the thought that bears the 
stamp of our age and our geography’; a limitation made perceptible ‘as 
the exotic charm of another system of thought’ and felt as ‘the stark 
impossibility of thinking that’ (1970: xv). The work ends with a 
consideration of psychoanalysis and ethnology as two ‘counter sciences’ 
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which flow in a direction opposite to that of the ‘human sciences’ [l], 
which ‘lead (these) back to their epistemological basis’, and which 
‘ceaselessly “ unmake” that very man who is creating and recreating his 
positivity’ by means of them (ibid.: 379). 
The quality of the two as ‘counter-sciences’ derives from their 
positive delineation of that finitude upon which all the other human 
sciences are based; their outlining of that ‘unthought’ toward which the 
modem cugito constantly toils, but cannot attain. Psychoanalysis con- 
stitutes for the human sciences the unconscious as ‘their most funda- 
mental object’ (ibid.: 372). In the mechanisms, forms or processes that 
give subjectivity its shape, psychoanalytic theory not only demonstrates 
that there is ‘always something still to be thought in what had already 
been thought on the manifest level’ (ibid.), but functions as well to 
reveal ‘the simple fact that it is possible for there to be system (and 
therefore signification), rule (therefore conflict), norm (therefore func- 
tion)’ in that which lies beyond thought (ibid.: 374). Just as psychoanal- 
ysis is situated with reference to the unconscious, so can ethnology be 
located with reference to historicity; the ‘fundamental object’ con- 
stituted by the former counter-science is thus complemented by the 
‘external boundary’ to thought that is articulated by the latter as the 
law of time (ibid.: 372). ‘Ethnology has its roots.. . in a possibility that 
properly belongs to the history of our culture, even more to its 
fundamental relation with the whole of history, [one which] enables it 
to link itself to other cultures in a mode of pure theory’ (ibid.: 377). 
In the ethnographic encounter with madness, the limitation of one’s 
thought is made perceptible twice over: first in the figure of the 
madman himself, then in the constitution of madness as a discursive 
object within the context of the culture under study. It is as if modem 
thought’s ‘fundamental object’ has been paradoxically relocated to its 
‘external boundary’ with the consequence that analysis becomes a 
[l] Foucault defines the human sciences in terms of their analytic function and location. Thus: 
‘The human sciences are not. then, an analysis of what man is by nature; but rather an analysis 
that extends from what man is in his positivity (living, speaking, labouring being) to what enables 
this same being to know (or seek to know) what life is, in what the essence of labour and its laws 
consist, and in what way he is able to speak. The human sciences thus occupy the distance that 
separates (though not without connecting them) biology, economics and philology from that which 
gives them possibility in the very being of man’ (Foucault 1970: 353). Within this general yet 
precise determination, they may be roughly described as psychology, sociology, and the study of 
literature and myth. 
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movement toward an unthought which is, in fact, another culture’s 
thinking toward the unthought in itself. Within the very alterity that is 
‘the exotic charm of another system of thought’, madness is constituted 
as an object which is itself ‘other’ to functions and norms, conflict and 
rules, signification and system. The penetration of this domain, i.e., the 
effort to articulate what is virtually inarticulable in it, carries the terms 
of our thought to their ‘limit, to that of their imaginable expressions, 
after which everything will be changed’ (ValCry 1972: 15). At such a 
point, we find that even the three figures which are ‘in fact the very 
forms of finitude as it is analysed in modem thought’ - viz. Death, 
Desire and Law (Foucault 1970: 374) - can themselves be reconstrued. 
Foucault suggests that these lie in the region where the representation 
by which men know (or seek to know) themselves and their lives 
‘remains in suspense, on the edge of itself, open, in a sense, to the 
closed boundary of finitude’ (ibid.). It is here that ‘we find outlined the 
three figures by means of which life, with its functions and norms, 
attains its foundation in the mute repetition of Death, conflicts and 
rules their foundation in the naked opening of Desire, signification and 
system their foundation in a language which is at the same time Law’ 
(ibid.). 
The ‘double negative’ that is the ethnographic encounter with mad- 
ness permits us to reconstitute Death, Desire, and Law less as ‘figures 
of finitude’ than as ‘virtual images’ (Freud 1953: 611) of consciousness 
in extremity. Having effects in the domain of social relations, construed 
as objectified moments of social experience, taken as models for social 
knowledge, the three take on a different aspect. Death becomes the 
death of reciprocity, Desire becomes the desire of a being genuinely 
other than the patient, and Law becomes the pronominal, logocizing 
emblem of truth as made manifest in divination. As a consequence the 
absolutes we think we glunpse beyond time and thought come to stand 
revealed as nonetheless bearing the trace of our own history and 
tradition, traces which the movement of modem thought has yet to 
efface. These are the marks left by the intervention of the notion of the 
text in the very idea of a subject: an intervention which makes possible 
the definition of madness as an illness of subjectivity (i.e., as a distorted 
or foreclosed historicity in the subject); an intervention whose limits 
can be seen only dimly by the light of a reality so enchanted or 
poeticized that language is not divided from the world, not even by 
being ‘written’ on it. 
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The Lakeside Tabwa of Shaba, Zaire [2], are a matrilineal, virilocal 
group who live primarily by subsistence farming (principally of manioc) 
and fishing the rich waters of Lake Tanganydca. Among the sane live 
the mad, sufferers from wazimu or its ‘mature’ (kukomaa), incurable 
form, kizenzezia. Some, who are constantly deranged, wander in and 
out of the periphery of social life, living in no fixed abode and eating by 
virtue of the charity of kin. Others live within society, but wander in 
and out of madness, becoming deranged twice a month at the new and 
full moons [3]. In their affliction, such people are not only figures in 
social history (i.e., those about whom there is story to be told), they are 
also incarnations of enigma. Simultaneously subjects and objects, they 
make directly apprehensible both the terrible limitations and the radical 
potential of consciousness in extremity. 
As a type of thinking toward the unthought, their articulation of 
consciousness in extremity is discussed by BaTabwa in three rather 
different discursive domains. First, there is consideration of wazimu 
itself as a fact of social life, and the problems it poses to the functions 
and norms of personhood. Then, in the consideration of a prodromal 
illness mubulibuli and certain related emotion states, madness is articu- 
lated in the dimension of intersubjectivity, as a figure for social thought 
marking the movement where conflict meets rule. Finally, in the consid- 
eration of the diviner‘s accession to clairvoyance, an accession made 
perilous by the risk of becoming mad, insanity is articulated as an 
emblem of social  knowledge, that is, of signification and system. 
Wuzimu as fact of social life 
In its constitution as a fact of social life, wazimu is first of all an illness 
entity whose multiple symptoms are fixed by Tabwa medical discourse. 
However, bizarre behavior which does not conform to the description is 
not considered a manifestation of illness, but is regarded as simply the 
(21 The data on which this paper is bascd were gathered during four years of field research in the 
area. covering the period 1974-1977. Funds for the study were derived from a U.S. Public Health 
SeMce Training Grant, a Wenncr-Grm Grant-In-Aid, and a Social Science Research Council 
Foreign A r e a  Fellowship. Opinions expressed in the paper are those of the author. 
[3] BaTabwa say these are the two times of the month when all chronic illnesses are exacerbated. 
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‘condition’ (hali) of the person [4]. The following exegesis of wazimu is 
a composite derived from numerous discussions with diviners and lay 
people. 
The start of wazimu is the heart that pounds (rho kupapa). If you 
take hold of the sick person, you can feel it beating. The heart ‘splits’ 
(kupasuka - this is the pounding) and comes out the middle of the top 
of the head (katikatiya kichwa) [5 ] .  If it comes to the eyes, it changes, 
it is other. It is as if fire comes to the eyes, as if the person sees fire, and 
the person begins to see ‘other things’ (uitu uingine) or things of 
‘another kind’ (uya namna ingine). He sees things others do not see. He 
speaks with ‘others’ (ba-ingine, literally ‘people of otherness’). You are 
there but conversation is with ‘others’, and the person no longer 
understands or responds to what people are saying to him. 
Wazirnu is characterized by violence. The person has become fierce 
or fierceness (makali) himself, and he sees fierce things. He takes up a 
machete because he sees people coming at him with machetes and so he 
readies himself. But it is really his kinspeople. He may see ten people in 
the space ahead of him, but you see no one. The least disturbance will 
cause him to grab a stick or knife and begin to kill children or goats. 
Friends will grab you, but you will see them differently. They will be 
enemies. The person has a desire to.run off to the bush, and has to be 
tied down. He wishes to remove his clothing, walks about naked, eats 
filth, grasses and leaves. He will perhaps even eat feces. One must be 
careful to tie the person with cords, to prevent his running off. If one is 
mistaken and the person gets away, only someone who knows medi- 
cines may get him back. He does this by going to the bush and 
gathering certain leaves. These he smokes, and he blows the smoke in 
the direction of the wazimu. Slowly the person comes close, and finally 
they are able to bring him back to the village. One may also call him by 
blowing on a medicated animal horn, as with Tulunga [6]. Once he has 
[4] Thus, the behavior of a young man who (upon losing a suit against his father) came home, 
stripped his mother naked, beat her and broke all her pots, was shrugged off by other people as 
‘his condition’ ( M i  yoke). However, there war commentary to the effect that he would probably 
Find it difficult to many, since a stranger could only expect worse treatment; and there was 
speculation about whether or not he might be cursed with bad luck because he had Seen his mother 
naked. 
[5] This is also the place where the soul leaves the body at death, as well as a place where sorcerers’ 
medicines may enter. 
(61 This is a type of divination whose relationship to madness is discussed at greater length below. 
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come to town, one begins to treat him with (ritual) medicines. Some are 
smoked, others he is given to lick and still others he wears. 
Each person who has this illness has a ‘friend’ (rafiki) [7] to whom 
he is especially attached. This person is the ‘origin’ (us i l i )  of the illness, 
and it is this person against whom the greater part of the wazimu’s 
violence is directed. To begin treatment, the person who is his ‘friend’ 
gradually comes closer and closer to him (for he may kill people) until 
he is finally able to offer the sick person food or medicine, then other 
treatments may ensue. With luck this wi l l  last only a week or so and the 
person wi l l  recover. One must be prompt to divine and find the path of 
the medicine (i-e., the appropriate therapeutic course). If the wazimu 
fails to get better, treatment wil l  at least get a person to settle down 
(kuinama - to lower the head, hence to be submissive) and no longer be 
violent or desire to walk naked. 
If the person is lucky, he will recover, but sometimes this does not 
happen. The medicines will fix him so that he does not run off, and so 
that ‘he recognizes himself as a person’ (anajitambua kuwa mutu), and 
no longer feels the desire to remove his clothes, or eat filth, ttc. But he 
is not well, the wazimu has ‘matured‘. To treat a person like this is 
worthless, and nobody bothers with medicines any more. The illness 
has matured, and has become ‘like‘the condition’ (kama hali yake) or 
‘like the character’ (kama tabia yake) of the person. He will never be 
any other way. Some days of the month he will be ‘quite a person’ and 
to speak with him, you will speak normally. But starting about three 
days before the new moon - or at the new moon and then for three 
days, it varies from person to person - the person will just sema-sema 
(i.e., speak constantly and nonsensically). They will shout obscenities, 
or speak to no one, and will stay up all night talking to and insulting no 
one. Once the moon has risen a bit in the sky (i.e., a few days after the 
new moon), they stop. They remain quiet for two weeks, and start again 
for another three-day period, when the moon ‘goes into the lake’ (i.e., 
when the moon rises out of the lake, in the east, at the full moon). 
This condition is called kizenzezia, which is the name given to 
wazimu when it has matured. In it, wazimu is ‘the health’ of the person 
[7] The use of the term rufiiki is significant because it is exclusive to this context. The usual term 
of reference for any one of a pair of human beings is ‘counterpart’, a word which stresses the 
equivalence and reciprocity in social relations, despite the fact that the members of the pair may 
stand in complementary roles to one another (i.e., mother-child, husband-wife, etc.). 
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(uzima wake), and the person never recovers. Treating him with medi- 
cines is useless, as he cannot be cured. He just stays that way, getting 
worse at the new and full moons, until he dies. Even if the person is 
cured a kilema (defect, deformity) must remain. Perhaps the person 
wdl be makali (fierce, sharp-tempered) or quarrelsome. It is not possi- 
ble for a person to recover from this without a kilema. With some 
people, the kilema of wuzimu will be apparent only if they drink or 
smoke marijuana. This is why these things are forbidden to a person 
who has had wazimu; no matter how long ago he has had it. 
Critical to our understanding of this description is a comprehension 
of the perspective from which it is drawn. It is a perspective essentially 
external to what we understand as subjectivity, one which articulates 
the inner experience of the patient only in schematized, minimal ways. 
All sufferers from wazimu are assumed to be seeing the same thing. 
Their experience is thus constituted as a reduction rather than a 
heightening of personal idiosyncracy, and yet profoundly ‘other’ to 
ordinary understanding. The common use of the phrase ‘of another 
kind’ (ya namna ingine) when speaking of the mentality of the mad 
conveys the sense of a basic alterity which somehow must be accepted 
as such. Tabwa discourse relating to madness is thus more a talking 
‘about’ it than an attempt to speak with it. 
Behaviorally, wazzmu can be described as an inversion of the out- 
ward aspects of personhood (umutu). The sick person wishes to run 
from village to bush, to remove his clothing, to shout obscenities, to be 
violent, and to eat filth. When mad, as people put it, he ‘is a person in 
terms of body only; in terms of mentality (he) is an animal‘ [8]. 
Madness is thus constituted as having place less in the interiority of the 
patient’s being than in the domain of his being-in-the-world. 
This idea is duplicated in the somatic aspects of the illness, for the 
point at which it begins is not solely when the heart ‘splits’, but when it 
also comes out of the top of the head, a point through which inner 
being has contact with the world. This is, in addition, the point by 
virtue of which we can begin to grasp an idea of the subject that is, for 
us, difficult to think, i.e., one where being is literally objectiue, where 
[S] ‘Kwa mwili ni murr lakini ni mutu kwa mwili r ~ .  h a  akili ni nyama.’ It is important, however, 
to bear in mind that the idea of madness as an inversion of personhood is quite different in its 
implications from the concept of madness as a regression to an earlier (hence, more ‘natural‘ or 
less socialized) developmental stage. 
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mentality is construable as an object among other objects in the world 
(since consciousness may be affected by ritual substances which enter 
through the top of a person’s head but without his perceiving it). 
Finally, the most enigmatic aspects of wazimu derive from its 
localization in the gaze and in speech. It is constituted as an illness of 
faculties, rather than of the materiality of the body. People make note 
of this when they compare madness to other illnesses ‘of the head’. 
With wazimu, the dilemma is that ‘one cannot say that the patient 
should be incised (hence, medicated) at a certain place, a vein‘. Its 
ephemeral, transient qualities lie at the center of its mystery. One 
diviner/practitioner put it thus: ‘If the person speaks to “others”, if he 
laughs at nothing, sings, whistles, this is the illness itself. It is an illness, 
it is not part of the body. If that tree gives birth to the other, then the 
other dies, how can you know what - if anything - it was? 
Through the image that it is ‘like fire’ [9] which comes to the eyes, 
BaTabwa articulate the idea that madness is a processuul presence 
which, like the intoxicating effects of drink or drugs, must be effaced if 
the patient is to be cured [lo]. The medicines employed in the attempt 
to make the patient ‘lower his head’ or be submissive (kuinama) 
include those which have the specific meaning of ‘extinguishing’ 
(kuzimishu) or cooling marked states [ll]. 
In addition, the two faculties in which the processual presence is 
localized are those particularly associated with knowledge and with 
transformation. BaTabwa speak of esorteric knowledge as ‘ to have eyes’ 
( k w u  nu macho). To know is to be possessed of a gaze by which one 
can recognize things for what they are, whether this be the identities of 
medicinal plants, the diagnosis of illness occurrences, the illusions 
created by sorcerers, or the sorcerers themselves. Knowledge is thus 
[9] In other domains of medical discourse fire, speech, and sexual generativity are all transforma- 
tive analogues; entities which are in fact processes whose unique characteristic is their explicit 
connection of being to becoming. 
(101 The effects of marijuana are particularly associated with madness. In fact, the two are 
identical except for the causative substance - hence, presumed transience - of the state caused by 
bangi. One pmon m a y  deeply insult another by implying that his perception of/behavior in a 
given conflict is due to marijuana smoking. By thus implying that he is like one mad, he (i.e., his 
intention or efficacy as an agent) cau be utterly dismissed and consequently the person himself 
deeply wounded or infuriated. 
Drunkness is the lesser analogue. Relating to madness only in the unrealistic extravagance of 
fecling/perception it produces. it is a folly people find quite amusing in the abstract. 
[ll] Interestingly the same medicines are also used to extinguish another extremity of conscious- 
ness - th is  one transgressive - viz, a chronic tendency to thievery. 
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equated with the perception. by which the world is constituted to the 
subject . 
Speech is the affecting counterpart to the gaze. As articulations of 
intention, utterances can have direct effect upon processes unfolding in 
the body, either promoting or subverting them. Similarly, invocations 
spoken to or through special objects (i.e., shrines, amulets) can have an 
effect upon those agents (e.g., ancestor spirits, avenging ghosts, other 
persons) whose intentions determine the unfolding of events. Speech is 
thus a medium through which the world is constituted by the subject. 
With the commonly held idea that at his death a person's voice goes 
into or becomes light, the two faculties are brought together. In their 
unioruwe may glunpse a world in which the determinate being of things 
derives as much from the field of predications surrounding them (a 
field in which knowledge and intention are combined) as it does from 
the things themselves, a feature which has a critical bearing on wazirnu 's 
status as an emblem of social knowledge. 
Thus, madness is not only defined as an illness of personhood more 
than of subjectivity. It is also an illness of mentality (aki l i )  - of 
intelligence or intellect - rather than of affect or instinct. This point is 
further developed in the exegesis of the term for wazirnu 's mature form, 
kizenzezia, a term deriving from an m e s s  or condition of chickens. In 
one conversation, kizenzezia was described thus: A chicken which is 
this way has no mentality to lay all her eggs in one place and then to set 
upon them, hatching them out. This sort of chicken wi l l  lay one egg in 
one place, and another in another. She will lay them anyhow (ouyo), 
and in places where the eggs are not safe. Then, too she will not set, but 
will just stop laying and then go about her business without a thought 
to them [12]. 
If madness is an illness of mentality, then, this description makes 
clear that it is one whose specific effects are regarded as deconstructive 
more than as degenerative. Depicted is not so much a deterioration 
within a mind as the specific absence of that mind's constructivist 
aspects, aspects which not only involve the putting of things together, 
but also the doing so toward some future result. Implied is the absence 
[12] The first sentence is Literally to state that the chicken 'has no mentality of saying that she put 
all her eggs together that she give birth' (honu akili kwu kusemu mveke mayui yuke yore pumoju 
uzue). Tightly interwoven in it  is the notion of putting things together toward some future end - 
i.e., building through or over time - and the connection between this aspect of mentality and 
speech. 
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of a properly generative self-consciousness, and when transposed to the 
domain of human life, such a mentality becomes one which decon- 
structs social relations. The circumstances of Ngandwe Kaluba, as 
discussed by others in this passage from field notes, mark a case in 
point. 
When she first was stricken with wuzimu, she had been a real terror. She would insult people 
and shout obscenities. They had had to bind her with cords. She had tried to run to the bush. 
She had thrown rocks at people and had beaten children. 
They had called a mfumu (diviner/practitioner) to treat her, but this had only succeeded in 
calming the thing somewhat. Now, she is just crazy twice a month, but she insults her mother 
vilely. 
Muzame said he’d passed the two of them working in their fields a few weeks ago, and had 
had to pause and be astonished (kushungao) at the obscenities Ngandwe hurled at her mother 
she weeded. He had been astounded, and had never seen or heard the like. She did not ‘know’ 
her mother (hmujui  mumu yoke) and just insulted her as if she were nothing. He said that 
when that woman’s mother died, she would have a very hard time, as no one in her family 
would wish to receive her because of her mouth (i.e., insults). 
Then, too, LUWNO added, she hated for her mother to speak to anyone on the path when 
they were coming from the field or going to it. She liked for her mother to predice (fonguliu) 
her, and if her mother dared to stop and talk to anyone, even in passing on the road, she would 
strike her or give a push, and say, ‘Let’s go! Let’s go!’ in a rude voice, forcing her mother to go 
on. 
Throughout all of this, her mother just remains quiet and says nothing. It is just the illness, 
what can one do? But everyone feels pity for her mother, because she is mightily afflicted by 
this illness of her child. 
Katato said that she had been quite as abusive of her father as she had been of her mother, 
until ‘God ransomed him in death’. She would see him returning from the fields and say such 
things as ‘Oh, so you’re baok. Let’s go sleep together now.’ 
This case adds to our understanding another layer, for wazirnu is not 
only an illness entity articulated in Tabwa medical discourse. It is also a 
social reality with which people must live. Ngandwe does not ‘know’ 
her mother. By insulting her, she treats her mother as though she were 
‘nothing’. Her incestuous remarks to her father had a similar effect: he, 
too, was as if ‘nothing’ to her. While this exquisitely inverted behavior 
appears to our post-Freudian thought as a type of hyper-recognition of 
certain individuals, the emphasis in Tabwa discussions of the matter is 
on the way in which such behavior deconstructs the precise diffeientia- 
tion among persons by virtue of which kinship forms the basis for 
reciprocity. 
In other discursive contexts the statement that one person is ‘noth- 
ing’ to another indicates in a superficial way that the two have no 
connection of kinship (real or classificatory) on the basis of which to 
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structure and limit enduring relations of reciprocity. There is no precise 
social distance that both separates and unites them, and there is no 
history of or necessity for interaction. In this context, as in the context 
of conflict, the term also implies the social violence of repudiation, a 
lack of restraint that collapses the distinctions of which the web of 
kinship is made. To be ‘nothing’ is to have been actively deconstituted, 
dis-recognized in one’s own personhood. It is a marked state. 
Hence, when treating her parents as ‘nothing’, Ngandwe, like all the 
mad, demonstrates a deconstructive extremity of consciousness which is 
such that she herself becomes a ‘bleep’ or cipher in the system of 
reciprocity. The inability of the mad to recognize themselves as persons 
finds its equivalent in their inability to constitute the personhood of 
others. The pity that people feel is for those who must act as kin to one 
utterly unable to ‘know’ them. It is for those who must fulfill the 
functions and meet the norms of reciprocity for no other reason than to 
do so. 
In the domain of social life, then, madness is established by BaTabwa 
as a consciousness which inverts the norms or functions of personhood 
(not subjectivity), and which undoes those of mentality (not instinct). 
When thus constituted in the field of social relations, the finitude that is 
the organism’s ‘mute repetition’ of Death can be transfigured, changed 
into the repeated deconstruction of reciprocity by a consciousness in 
extremity. In the form of the burden that madness imposes upon the 
sane, this Death becomes the means by which a virtual image of 
reciprocity us such is cast up in ongoing social relations. 
A figure for social thought 
If wazimu itself is constituted in the dimensions of personhood, mental- 
ity and reciprocity, it is in the prodromal illness, mubulibuli, and related 
states that we find extremity of consciousness articulated in terms of 
affect and experience. Discourse in this domain stresses the moment 
when conflict envelopes rule and the subject’s being-in-the-world is 
transformed by the Desire of another. The description of mubulibuli is 
as follows. 
The person feels his heart pounding. Perhaps it will come out 
through the head. If sleeping or trying to, the person will no longer be 
able to tolerate loud noises near him. If people are drumming, he will 
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drive them off. Or he does not like having noise near his head, such as 
being called or addressed in a loud voice. He also cannot be awakened 
with force, grabbed and loudly called. In response to all these things he 
may whirl about and beat one. In response to abrupt awakening, the 
person may faint and only slowly will he recover. He may also have 
‘many thoughts’ (mawazo mengi). This state can go on for a long time; 
even as much as a year or more. But if it is not treated the person may 
gradually become more and more fierce; it will change into wazimu. 
This description may be divided into two significant elements, each 
of which can be amplified by pursuing its connection to other states. 
First is the sensation of the pounding heart (rho kupapa), a feeling also 
characteristic of wazimu. BaTabwa say that one may feel this if one is 
startled or is frightened. In these situations, the sensation is not 
indicative of illness. However, this feeling also happens when one is 
spoken ill of by others, or when others triumph in one’s misfortune; 
two types of social violence that are covered by a single word, kusi- 
mangwa. Under these circumstances, one may feel pain in the heart as 
well as pounding. The lack of tranquility (amani) felt at such times is 
called mutima wapota, ‘twisting of the heart’, and is recognized as a 
state that can be prodromal to mubulibuli. This is especially the case 
when the twisting of the heart derives from anger (akisirani, asira) the 
emotion which, as fierceness (makali) or irritability, constitutes the 
second significant element of mubulibuli. 
When they speak of the emotion, BaTabwa relate anger to the 
experience of having been wronged, unjustly treated, as when a person 
strikes one’s child without reason or when someone commits adultery 
with one’s spouse. A person deeply resentful is said to have ‘closed 
anger’ (kufunga asira) in his heart. When in this state of mind, a person 
‘sits in one place, does not speak, does not eat, does not go very far. 
One says “he has closed anger”. He sits with bad thoughts in his heart. 
If they tease or vex him (kuchokoza), he may rise up to kill’. 
As with mubulibuli itself, then, the closing of anger in the heart is 
discussed in association with irritability and many thoughts. Both states 
of mind are characterized by an indefiniteness of object which places 
the subject’s consciousness in a position of extremity. In it, he is 
alienated from interactions and so is ‘closed‘ off from the processual 
time inherent in ongoing experience. In its relation to specific cmes of 
madness, this situation of consciousness in extremity presents an in- 
verse aspect. At this level, we find that the cause actually attributed to 
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almost all instances of wazimu is sorcery deriving from one whom the 
sick person has previously wronged, always by adultery. Madness is 
thus the artifact of another’s desire for revenge. Yet, this desire for 
revenge is itself a type of extremity in consciousness; a grudge ( fitina) 
related to anger but deeper, and deeply attached to its object. BaTabwa 
are quite clear about it: ‘If a person commits adultery (kufanya upuzi, 
literally “to do folly”) with your spouse, you don’t wish to see the 
person any more. If you hear the person is sick you will be happy 
because they might die. Even if you don’t see the person you may think 
of them and become angry again, just at the thought.’ 
Complementarily, one must know that the commission or adultery 
can only result in a similar feeling in others. In one conversation it was 
put thus: ‘With fitina one would have to know that the other person 
felt this. Fitina would occur if, say, one had committed adultery with 
another man’s wife. If that man found out about it, even if one had 
been friends before; the friendship would be ruptured. Though one 
would have admitted one’s guilt and paid reparations, and though he 
would have accepted the money and relations been apparently restored, 
you would know that in lm heart, fitina was what he felt. Even if he 
did not say anything, and continued to speak to one, one would either 
see it in his behavior or just know @at it would have to be there, on the 
basis of knowing what one had done to him. He could not feel any 
other way, and in the end he might be one to get medicines to kill or 
derange you. You therefore try to avoid him.’ 
Crucial to these descriptions is the ineffaceability of affect. Despite 
admissions of guilt and restitutive actions, the ill feeling remains. As it 
was put in another discussion, the wronged spouse has been ‘trans- 
formed into a fool’ ( unanigauza rnupurnbafu) by one’s transgression, 
and the intensity of animosity derives from their experience of this 
diminution. Hence, though not itself explicitly discussed in terms of 
affect and experience, wazimu can be seen as the figure underlying a 
temporal extremity of consciousness in the domain of conflict and rule. 
Both in the states which may be prodromal to wazimu and in the 
emotions one’s own transgression can cause in others, there is a fixity 
which draws consciousness out of experiential time. In the former it is 
the indefiniteness of object; in the latter, the ineffaceability of affect. 
Both stand opposed to the ordinarily transient irritation which is part 
and parcel of social life. Referring to it by the term chuki, people say 
this sense of irritation can occur when, for example, ‘you see another 
582 C. Davis-Roberts / Consciousness in extremity 
coming just at the time of eating or drinking, because you see that there 
will not be enough for yourself. You will have to eat or drink less. 
Perhaps you say to your wife that she should not bring out the food 
until after the person has gone. Or perhaps you call him anyway. In 
either case after the food is eaten, the chuki passes and one is friends 
again with the person.’ 
In sharp contrast to this stands the chuki of the sorcerer. Like all 
chuki, it is kept a secret, for the feeling itself is a diminution of others 
and its expression can only be taken as insulting. Unlike normal chuki, 
however, that of the sorcerer is so far from being transient as to be 
wholly formative of the individual‘s character. In addition, it may 
become attached to one without reason, or on the basis of insignificant 
conflict, and then endure until its object dies. As it was put in one witty 
consideration of the subject: if a sorcerer feels chuki toward you, only 
when you are dead will such a person be happy; only then does his 
anger with you finish. If he gets very tired of seeing you, he may make 
medicines to kill you. He will be the first to arrive at your funeral and 
will even help with the digging of the grave, but only so as to be the 
more quickly rid of seeing your face. 
Taken together then, mubulibuli and related emotion states form a 
constellation centering around the figure of wuzirnu and articulating the 
intersubjective domain where conflict envelopes rule. Here, it is not the 
affect as such which is in question; for the anger, irritation or grudge 
appear entirely comprehensible, indeed, even expected, on the simple 
basis of transgressive circumstances commonly and repeatedly experi- 
enced by everyone. Instead, it is the fixity of feeling which marks the 
extremity of these states of consciousness. 
As a figure for social thought, wazirnu enables us to see how the 
finitude that is the ‘naked opening’ of the subject’s sexual Desire can be 
reconstrued. Taken as a subject’s vulnerability to the destructive desire 
of others, it becomes a virtual image of violation. In both the closure of 
rnubulibuli and the derangement that can derive from sorcery, what has 
happened is that the person has become the object of someone else’s 
(malicious) pleasure, a token in someone else’s game. Articulated from 
the perspective of both the wronged person (kufungu miru) and the 
punished transgressor, this objectification of being casts up in experi- 
ence and makes available for thought the ‘as suchness’ of the very 
moment when desire overflows limits and swamps restraint. 
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Emblem of social knowledge 
In considering the ways in which people may become diviners, we 
complete our understanding of the role played by wazimu in Tabwa 
discourse. This is the domain of social knowledge, i.e., the area in which 
knowledge is established about and through social relations. It is here 
that the features of madness are rearticulated as cultural constructs. By 
means of this appropriation, the hollow inversion of personhood 
becomes an emblem of insight, and the ‘otherness’ of gaze and speech is 
transformed into the histonzing power of clairvoyance; but only at the 
risk of insanity itself. 
Each of the two principle types of divination used by BaTabwa is 
significantly connected to wazimu. Bulumbu diviners possessing spirits 
may make their initial appearance as a derangement which can become 
permanent if it is not properly managed. Tulunga diviners are given 
medicines which make them behave as if mad during their ceremonial 
initiation. Here, the overturned consciousness, characteristic of wazimu, 
becomes an aperture through which signification and system can re- 
establish the continuity of lives disrupted by affliction and/or misfor- 
tune. When accepted by clients, the diviner’s pronouncements become a 
Law which reorders and so develops the histories of lineage groups. 
The connection between spirit possession and madness is made in 
the consideration of specific cases of derangement. At this level the 
madness caused by a spirit must be distinguished from other wazimu if 
cure is to be possible. Distinction sometimes can be made on the basis 
of particular features, such as the singing of Bulumbu songs during the 
illness. Most often, however, the link between the two is established 
after the fact of cure has confirmed the truth of divination; or the 
failure of cure by non-ceremonial means has left the person perma- 
nently deranged. 
Treatment of this form of madness, like treatment of all illnesses 
deriving from possessing spirits, consists of a ceremony in which the 
spirit itself is ‘put in order’ (kutengeneza). To drumming and singing 
directed by adepts who are themselves possessed, the patient is 
‘mounted’ by the spirit, which then speaks its name and states the 
reason why it has come. Once arranged, the spirit may possess the 
person when it is called, or when it chooses. In either case the 
cgnsciousness of the person is said to have been ‘overturned’ (kupindua), 
so that he himself is unaware of what the spirit says or does when it 
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possesses him. This image of overturning is precisely that most often 
employed by people to refer to that state of madness. Here, however, 
the overturning results in a capacity to see things others do not see, to 
know things without having learned of them mundanely. 
With the initiation of Tulunga diviners, medicinal plants induce a 
state of mind which BaTabwa characterize both as resembling madness 
and as bringing the novice periolously close to becoming mad. The 
person trembles violently and is agitated. Everything glows before him 
as with an inner light. Stripped of most of his clothing he runs about 
wildly, searching for two medicine-filled horns which have been hidden 
by the adepts and which he must find if he is to accede to his power. He 
is said to hear nothing other than the sound of the bell attached to the 
horn he is seeking. In this state of mind, the novice can be controlled 
only by the use of a medicated whistle blown by a senior adept. Failing 
this, he would run off to the bush and be lost. Indeed, the novice’s 
vulnerability is such that his return to sanity is guaranteed only by the 
strength of his mentor’s medicines, for a sorcerer can render him 
permanently insane by simply stamping his foot on the ground at this 
time. 
In the domain of social knowledge, then, madness is constituted as 
the emblem of insight. By ‘putting-it in order’ and by risking it, 
particular individuals make of their consciousnesses locations whose 
very extremity, whose ‘otherness’, permits a mediation between specific 
instances of problematic illness and the affecting agents (ancestors, 
spirits, avenging ghosts, sorcerers, etc.) which have caused them. Such 
agents are said to present themselves directly to the diviner in dreams 
or in his possessed state and to tell him why then caused the misfortune 
in question. There is thus a respect in which diviners can be said to look 
‘through’ particular circumstances to see and to speak of the predicat- 
ing history from which those circumstances derive. 
The ceremonies required by divinatory pronouncement can similarly 
function to change the predications on the basis of which people live. 
Grudges and transgressions must be confessed; quarreling and ill will 
within the lineage group must cease, at least temporarily, if the 
ceremonies are to work and the patient be cured. Indeed, it is partly by 
considering what they wil l  have to do to accomplish this that people 
determine whether or not to accept the diviner’s insights. 
The consciousness of the diviner thus becomes the means by which 
signification and system are rearticulated in the ongoing of individuals. 
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It is an aperture by virtue of which people may ghmpse the extremity of 
determinate cause and so come to reorder their more proximate rela- 
tions. If, however, the diviner articulates Law, it is a law whose 
particular form is an emblematic, as ‘mad’ as madness itself; for what 
is presented in divinatory seances is not an analysis of circumstances, 
but a pronominal structure of truth. The diviner will describe only the 
barest situational outline; saying, for example, that he has seen ‘two 
women, an older chasing a younger one’, or ‘a snake looking down onto 
a bed from the wall above’. It is to the assembled group of kin to work 
on the Law presented in this condensed, poeticized mode and in the 
working to find their liberation from affliction. 
In its capacity as an emblem for social knowledge, then, madness 
becomes a model for the generation of lineage group history. The 
diviner’s extremity of consciousness permits the reestablishment by 
signification and system of social relations whose order has been 
disrupted by the discontinuity of problematic illness. Here, Law be- 
comes the virtual image of determinate agency actively expressing itself 
through affliction, and history can be seen as the constitution of an 
ongoing present. 
Conclusion 
In the analysis of Tabwa thought toward the basic ‘otherness’ of 
consciousness in extremity, we find a movement which resembles that 
of our modem cognito with endless pursuit of the unthought. Indeed, 
implicit in the very term ‘resemblance’ is the delicate play between 
identity and difference by which we are most enlightened; for the 
discourse under discussion here operates beyond textuality, even though 
it can be made into a text. As a consequence, it presents a type of 
human science whose ‘economy’ we must struggle to comprehend. 
Rather than figures of finitude establishing the h u t s  of representa- 
tion - figures which can only be detected by an accumulation of 
examples (repetition), a sensitivity to lacunae (deconstruction), or an 
analysis of relations (grammar) - we find instead the virtual images cast 
up by extremity, images in which function and norm, conflict and rule, 
signification and system may be ghmpsed as such on the very surface of 
social life. Like the truth of an enchanted reality, it is all there for those 
who ‘have eyes’ (kuwa nu macho) to see, or ears to hear the discourse of 
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others. This is to say that in its capacity as a sort of archaerepresenta- 
tion, extremity does not silence speech, but provokes discussion. If we 
wish to locate the non-textualized human sciences in cultures like that 
of the Tabwa, we may do so by focussing on conversations which are, 
in a sense, epistemogenic; i.e., ones in which people employ what they 
know of their culture to comprehend the aporias presented by their 
lived experience. 
What discussions, such as those on madness, generate is not the 
proliferation of texts but the continuous constitution of (sane) persons 
to and by each other; the redelineation or reconsideration of aspects of 
culture; and the ongoing transformation of particular gazers and 
speakers by their experience. The movement generated by non-textual- 
ized human sciences is thus the displacement of the persons in whose 
consciousness these sciences are lodged. This includes ethnographers 
when they are present. 
It is the ethnographer who writes things down and who is able, 
therefore, to reconstruct from widely separated conversations about 
apparently diverse topics the several discursive domains in which 
madness figures as an entity. In her text, she constitutes something 
present in the field experience, but which is both thought and un- 
thought there. It is dispersed precisely. because conversation is both too 
regional and too playful in its movements for any one discussion to 
include the whole. What she presents as Tabwa thought toward consci- 
ousness in extremity, as non-textualized human sciences, is thus an 
artifact of her textualization. However, it is a textualization whose 
purpose has been to demonstrate the ways in which another f o m  of 
thinking about thought can be derived from the content of speech, a 
form which can address with increased directness the limits of our own. 
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Le fou permet d’apprkhender les possibilitb-limites de la prise de conscience: il confronte la 
pens& discursive avec ce qui virtuellement se dQobe a I’articulation et a la reflexion. 
Les Tabwa riverains du Lac au Shaba (ZaLre) apprehendent la folie sous un triple angle 
discursif. Wuzimu, et kizenzezin qui en constitue la forme parvenue ‘a maturitt‘ et incurable, est 
consider& d‘embke sous I’angle social, en tant qu’elle invertit les normes et les fonctions de la 
personnalite, defait celles de la mentalitt et dhrt icule  la rkiprocitk: cette forme de folie prefigure 
la ‘Mort’. Deuxihent,  c’est dam I’atteinte mubulibuli. et dans les etats ernotifs associks, que la 
folie apparait comme le produit du ‘Desir‘ malicieux et intrusif de l’autre: le fou, dit-on, s’enferme 
dans son coeur pris de colere et se voit coupk de toute interaction et experience en cours. 
Finalement, c’est dans le devin que ‘I’alttritt‘ du regard et du parler est transform& en une 
clairvoyance fondatrice de logique, d’histoire et de normes. L’inversion des attributs de la personne 
se mue ici en embleme de regard dtvoileur et de ‘Loi’, tout en fr6lant I’insanite. La rencontre 
ethnographique avec cette veritable alterite de la folie, ainsi qu’avec la pens& qu’une autre culture 
developpe au sujet de I’impensk, s’avere etre, dans un certain sens, f5pistemoginique. 
